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Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Exxon v Bakerly reviewed the history of punitive dam- ages in the United States. At issue was the appro- priate amount of punitive damages the plaintiffs should receive as a result of damage caused by an Exxon supertanker grounding on a reef and spilling millions of gallons of oil into Prince William Sound, Alaska. The plaintiffs were com- mercial fishers, seafood producers, and others who relied on Prince William Sound to make their livings. What made the circumstancesTof the acci dent particularly egregious was that the captain, who had a history of drinking problems, “inexpli- cably left the bridge, leaving a tricky course 00 correction to unlicensed subordinates.” Expert evidence indicated that the captain was legally impaired at the time of the accident. At trial, the jury awarded $5 billion in punitive damages against Exxon, which was lowered to $2.5 billion by the appeals court. The US. Supreme Court low- ered that amount even further, based on its view that punitive damages, in federal maritime law, should be limited to the same amount as the com- pensatory damages. Compensatory damages in this case were set at $507.5 million, and therefore an equivalent amount was awarded by way of punitive damages. In bolstering its analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that some states have regulated punitive damages by legislation, such as, for example, limiting them to a 3:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, with Nebraska going so far as to ban punitive awards altogether.” The Supreme Court’s view was that, contrary to myth, there have been no “mass-produced runaway awards” in the United States.”? However, the court acknowledged that “punitive damages overall are higher and more frequent in the U.S. than anywhere else” and, more importantly, expressed concern about the “stark unpredictability of punitive awards in the United States. Setting a 1:1 ratio would alleviate that problem. The court was fortified in its selec- tion of a 1:1 ratio by studies indicating that most awards of punitive damages put the median ratio at less than 1:1. In the court’s words, “we consider that a 1:1 ratio, which is above the median award, is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases,”45 among other matters, discusses the punitive damages awarded against Exxon in a civil class action suit. In addition to being subject to a successful civil action described in the box, Exxon was indicted by the U.S. federal government on five criminal charges with potential penalties totaling $5 billion. The company soon agreed to plead guilty to three counts with a fine of $25 million, or less than 1 percent of the total potential criminal fine, plus $900 million in civil fines to be paid over 10 years. In addition, the company paid $2.1 billion in cleanup costs and several hundred million dollars more to fishermen for their lost summer catch. In all, the company paid $3.4 billion. 1. Are these penalties sufficient? Why or why not? 2. Are there other penalties that could have been imposed? What are they and why or why not may they be used?