Receiver Coffee Ivey Case Study

9B20A010

 

RECEIVER COFFEE: BREWING UP WHOLESALE CUSTOMERS Eric Dolansky wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The author does not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The author may have altered certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality. This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) [email protected]; www.iveycases.com. Our goal is to publish materials of the highest quality; submit any errata to [email protected]. i1v2e5y5pubs Copyright © 2020, Ivey Business School Foundation Version: 2020-02-24

It was September 2018, and the summer tourist season for Receiver Coffee (Receiver) was winding down. Colleen MacKay, co-owner of the Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island (PEI)-based coffee roaster, was eager to determine how best to grow her business. It was not that the company lacked success because, with two café locations in Charlottetown and year-over-year growth of over 100 per cent, Receiver was thriving. Instead, the concern was that MacKay and her partners had reached the ceiling of what could be done in their market, and they were looking to increase their wholesale revenues. MacKay had been involved with the company since early 2015, and during that time, it had increased in its demand and roasting capacity, added a location, and widened its product offering. The owners believed they had found a true point of differentiation: Receiver was about the coffee, how it was sourced, how it was roasted, and how it was sold. “We are always moving toward the most ethical way to source our inputs,” said MacKay, “and we are fairly unique in PEI as to what we’re doing.” The company’s three goals, according to its website, were “. . . to provide coffee that is sweet, exciting and ethically sourced; to create unique, delicious food and baked goods; and [to] cultivate community.” Receiver had opened its second location in June 2017, but, according to MacKay, “. . . by month eight of being in that space we knew we had grown out of it.” A third phase of growth was planned for summer 2019, with production space to house the roaster and a bakery with a small café storefront. At the same time, MacKay was trying to expand its wholesale coffee sales to cafés in the Maritimes,1 Ontario, and Quebec. Business was set to slow in the coming weeks as the high season ended, allowing for more time to plan and build a customer base outside of PEI. It was important that this time be used wisely, as much could be accomplished during the low season. MacKay admitted the problem: “I don’t know where to start!” RECEIVER COFFEE Receiver began its life in Charlottetown, PEI, in June 2012 as a small coffee roaster and café with baked goods offerings. It was originally named Row 142, which Mackay described as follows: “Row 142 was a very small space with only a small bench to sit on and not much more.” She continued, saying, “Row 142 was where coffee enthusiasts flocked, as it offered specialty coffee not previously available on PEI.” 1 The Maritimes were a set of four provinces on Canada’s east coast: Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland & Labrador.

Au th

or iz

ed fo

r u se

o nl

y by

A lin

a Fa

ur in

M an

ge tin

g M

an ag

em en

t 6 21

a t U

ni ve

rs ity

C an

ad a

W es

t f ro

m J

ul 2

0, 2

02 0

to O

ct 1

1, 2

02 0.

U se

o ut

si de

th es

e pa

ra m

et er

s is

a c

op yr

ig ht

v io

la tio

n.

 

 

Page 2 9B20A010 In 2014, the owners took advantage of an opportunity to move the business four doors up on Victoria Row. This cobblestone street was a pedestrian mall of cafés, bars, and boutiques, and was considered one of Charlottetown’s main tourist attractions. The new location was better for foot traffic and had more space. “That’s when Receiver came to be,” MacKay explained. Founders Chris Francis and Sean Bruinooge saw the restaurant as a kind of “Cheers of Charlottetown.”2 According to MacKay, “. . . you would always know someone when you went there; PEI lacked that until Receiver opened.” MacKay’s background was in accounting; she had earned an accounting certificate and a diploma in business administration. She had worked as an administrative and finance officer for the Port of Charlottetown, and she had also worked in the service industry since age 18. She first began to help with Receiver’s accounting, human resources, and general organization. The business continued to grow, and by 2016 there were signs of strain on its capacity. Receiver was using a small, six-pound3 (2.72 kilograms) coffee roaster that could not keep up with the demand generated by the café and wholesale business. The roaster was moved out of the Victoria Row space to add seating, which opened a conversation about finding a new space for roasting. In March 2017, this discussion became focused on The Brass Shop, a newly available space in Charlottetown, where Receiver could both run a café and roast the coffee. In the final week of April 2017, Receiver took possession of The Brass Shop and began renovations. MacKay said, “. . . we took the space, stripped it down and only the exterior walls were left.” The goal had been to open by July 1, and the first customers were welcomed on June 29. Around the same time, Receiver applied for financing to purchase a roaster with five times the capacity of the previous one. This new equipment, which arrived in September 2017 and was working by October, could meet the needs of the two current establishments as well as the wholesale demand. As MacKay put it, “Off to the races we went.” The company grew again when its bakery supplier, Breadworks, approached the partners. Receiver’s purchases represented 55 per cent of Breadworks’ business, and the owner was preparing to retire. Receiver bought the organic bakery business around the same time it moved into The Brass Shop. “The bakery was a bigger part of the puzzle than we ever expected it to be,” MacKay explained. Breadworks was one of the only organic bakeries actively pursuing wholesale accounts in PEI and was valued as a supplier of Receiver’s own bakery requirements in addition to supplying other Breadworks customers. Because of the rapid growth through expansion and acquisition, 2017 and 2018 revenues showed year-over- year increases of 100–150 per cent. As a result, Receiver was looking at a third phase of growth targeted for May or June of 2019, possibly including a new space, a bakery storefront, and, most prominently, increased capacity for greater wholesale revenues.

THE COFFEE INDUSTRY IN 2018 Coffee was big business in Canada. Industry revenues were CA$6.2 billion4 in 2017, split between coffee sold through restaurants, cafés, bars, and other food service companies ($4.8 billion) and coffee sold through grocery and other retail stores ($1.4 billion).5 According to the Coffee Association of Canada, 71

2 “Cheers” was a television show that ran on NBC from 1982 to 1993 about a group of regulars at a bar in Boston. The title of the show’s theme song was “Where Everybody Knows Your Name.” 3 1 pound = 454 grams; 1,000 grams = 1 kilogram. 4 CA$ = Canadian dollars. All dollar amounts are in CA$, unless otherwise specified. 5 “Coffee Facts: Coffee in Canada,” Coffee Association of Canada, accessed October 2, 2018, www.coffeeassoc.com/coffee-facts/.

Au th

or iz

ed fo

r u se

o nl

y by

A lin

a Fa

ur in

M an

ge tin

g M

an ag

em en

t 6 21

a t U

ni ve

rs ity

C an

ad a

W es

t f ro

m J

ul 2

0, 2

02 0

to O

ct 1

1, 2

02 0.

U se

o ut

si de

th es

e pa

ra m

et er

s is

a c

op yr

ig ht

v io

la tio

n.

 

 

Page 3 9B20A010 per cent of Canadians between the ages of 18 and 79 drank coffee on any given day, with that number rising to 81 per cent for those who drank coffee at least once per week, and 85 per cent for those who drank coffee at least once per year.6 This figure actually made coffee the beverage with the highest penetration rate in Canada, beating out tap water (67 per cent), bottled water (44 per cent), tea (48 per cent), alcohol (43 per cent), and carbonated beverages (29 per cent). Growth trends within the coffee market were largely driven by specific product categories. In 2013, 13 per cent of Canadians drank espresso-based beverages (cappuccinos, lattes, etc.); in 2017, that number had increased to 23 per cent. Among Canadians aged 18–79, eight per cent drank newer preparations of coffee, such as cold brew, frozen blended coffee, and nitro coffee.7 There were trends away from drinking coffee at home—79 per cent of people prepared and drank coffee at home in 2015, but only 76 per cent did so in 2017. At the same time, out-of-home consumption rose from 38 per cent in 2015 to 44 per cent in 2017. The use of single-cup home brewing systems (e.g., Tassimo, Keurig), had grown a lot in recent years, with 15 per cent penetration in 2012 vs. 38 per cent in 2015, but had stagnated, with no further growth after 2015.8 Margins and costs of production varied a great deal depending on the quality of the coffee. On average, according to the Specialty Coffee Association, unroasted commodity-quality9 coffee beans sold for $1.75– $2.25 per pound, and specialty coffee beans were priced at the upper end of that range and beyond. This price would cover costs of production, such as labour, certifications, transportation, and supplies (e.g., fertilizer), as well as a small profit for the grower. Roasters purchased the coffee beans, with prices based on negotiation. Roasters like Receiver incurred costs of production, labour, packaging and marketing, and import fees. Shrinkage10 was also an issue—about 18 per cent of the weight of the coffee was lost during roasting, so one pound (454 grams) purchased resulted in 0.82 pounds of roasted coffee. A roaster would typically sell the roasted coffee for two to four times the cost of the unroasted beans.11 Roasters sold coffee to cafés and restaurants, as well as to individuals who prepared coffee at home. Cafés could get approximately 16 cups of coffee per pound of beans, and they sold each cup, on average, for about $2.00. This revenue covered the operating costs of the café, the price of the coffee, and the café’s profit. THE THIRD WAVE OF COFFEE Coffee, appreciated around the world, was both a simple and complex product. It could be viewed as a common start to the day, a cheap fast-food product, and a convenient drink. It could also be viewed as a refined, special beverage that had intricate flavour notes. Receiver’s perspective was the latter, and it treated this product with care. “We only buy beans graded 85 or higher [out of 100],” MacKay said. According to Francis, “A short-term goal is to push the ceiling on the grade we are buying,” to further boost quality levels; however, price pressures made this difficult. Receiver’s approach to coffee fell within the definition of the “third wave” of coffee. This approach to coffee treated it as a unique, artisanal, high-quality foodstuff along the lines of caviar or wine. This was in contrast to the notion that coffee was a commodity, which was a more traditional view of the product. Third

6 “Canadian Coffee Consumption, 2017,” Coffee Association of Canada infographic, accessed October 2, 2018, www.coffeeassoc.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CanadianCoffee2017infographic_whitebkd-2.pdf. 7 Ibid; Nitro coffee is cold-brew coffee infused with nitrogen gas, which results in a creamy beverage. 8 Ibid. 9 As differentiated from specialty coffee. 10 Evaporation of water during roasting, leading to overall loss of weight. 11 Maria Hill, “The Cost of a Cup of Coffee: Where Does the Money Go?,” Specialty Coffee Association, October 2, 2018, accessed July 11, 2019, www.scanews.coffee/2014/09/15/the-cost-of-a-cup-of-coffee-where-does-the-money-go-2/.

Au th

or iz

ed fo

r u se

o nl

y by

A lin

a Fa

ur in

M an

ge tin

g M

an ag

em en

t 6 21

a t U

ni ve

rs ity

C an

ad a

W es

t f ro

m J

ul 2

0, 2

02 0

to O

ct 1

1, 2

02 0.

U se

o ut

si de

th es

e pa

ra m

et er

s is

a c

op yr

ig ht

v io

la tio

n.

 

 

Page 4 9B20A010 wave meant that it focused on unique beans, subtleties of flavour, and overall quality. Single-origin coffee,12 also valued by Receiver, was a key notion of this perspective. In a practical sense, this meant that every stage of the acquisition, treatment, and sale of the coffee was carefully considered. Receiver used only single-origin beans and did not buy “sunset crops”—that is, beans that had passed their best-before date. According to MacKay, “We can trace our beans back to the farm and when it was harvested.” In contrast, coffee retailers Tim Hortons and Starbucks used commodity and lower-end beans, blended them all together, and roasted them for a longer period of time. MacKay explained,

. . . they have to roast beans until the flavour of roasting overpowers the natural characteristics of the coffee, because the only way to get it to taste the same is to over-roast it. . .the big chains are not local [and] they’re not selling a premium product; they press a button and an espresso comes out. It’s more about the brand than the coffee.

Using fresher, unique beans allowed different characteristics and flavours to shine, and Francis claimed, “. . . buying smaller micro-lots of coffee allowed us to find more unique coffees that have these special characteristics; large crops just don’t yield the same quality as a small one.”

THE PRODUCT Receiver selected and sampled beans through multiple coffee brokers. The company owners hand-selected which coffees they wanted, selecting only from the top 15 per cent of coffee beans in the world, even if that meant buying a very small amount at a time. “We may buy something for which there’s only eight bags available,” said MacKay, “and we bought a crop from Honduras; we bought the whole crop and were the only people in the world to have that bean.” By 2018, Receiver was roasting about 1,000 pounds (454 kilograms) of coffee per week just to keep up with demand. Half of this coffee was used for customers in the two cafés, and the other half was sold as wholesale product. The plan was that during the low season from October to May, 500–700 pounds (226– 318 kilograms) per week would be roasted, but inventory could not be built up, as freshness was paramount. Ideally, consumption of coffee should occur within three weeks of roasting. Receiver’s signature product was its Operator Blend. Even though it would change with the seasons, the blend always stayed within the same flavour profile to make it accessible and affordable. In addition to this product, Receiver would have three to five single-origin beans available, which would change every three weeks or so as new product came in. These beans were sourced from Central and South America, as well as East Africa. Receiver roasted coffee five days per week to keep up with demand. If wholesale customers wanted a particular flavour profile, Receiver could source beans that fit the profile and roast them to make sure those flavours came to the forefront; Receiver also offered the coffee branded with the wholesale customer’s brand. The roasted coffee sold either wholesale in 5-pound (about 2.5-kilogram) bags for commercial use, priced from $55.00 to $95.00 depending on the bean, or retail in 12-ounce13 (340-gram) bags for personal use, priced from $15.50 to $20.00.

12 Single-origin meant that a batch of roasted coffee beans all originated from one source, as opposed to coffee blends, which combined coffee from different sources, harvests, and growers. 13 1 ounce = 28 grams.

Au th

or iz

ed fo

r u se

o nl

y by

A lin

a Fa

ur in

M an

ge tin

g M

an ag

em en

t 6 21

a t U

ni ve

rs ity

C an

ad a

W es

t f ro

m J

ul 2

0, 2

02 0

to O

ct 1

1, 2

02 0.

U se

o ut

si de

th es

e pa

ra m

et er

s is

a c

op yr

ig ht

v io

la tio

n.

 

 

Page 5 9B20A010 THE COMPETITION “We’re small, but we’re bigger than most in our market; most businesses lean toward being either a café or a roaster, but not both,” MacKay had remarked in 2018. While Receiver did not consider Tim Hortons and Starbucks as competition, MacKay recognized that customers might believe they were, especially if they were just looking to buy “a coffee” rather than a high-quality beverage. In the Maritimes there was only one major roaster that shared values similar to Receiver with regard to coffee beans—Anchored Coffee, based in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. Anchored billed itself as “Transparently Sourced, Carefully Developed, Consistently Delicious.” It was similar to Receiver, valuing transparency in it purchasing and selling activities and maintaining a respectful attitude toward coffee and the people who grew it. Prices for 340-gram bags available on Anchored’s website ranged from $18–$26. Wholesale customers were also a major revenue source for Anchored. MacKay said, “. . . we are one of few specialty roasters in the region, and Anchored is another.” Java Blend, another Nova Scotia-based roaster, was also similar to Receiver. It had a café in Halifax and had been in business for 80 years as of 2018. Java Blend claimed on its website to source beans from around the world and that their roasters “. . . lie awake at night trying to figure out how to best extract all the amazing flavour that is already inside the great coffee we are so lucky to be able to roast.” Java Blend also had a wholesale business, offering customers roasts on demand, next-day delivery, and free shipping on orders of 30 pounds (about 15 kilograms) of coffee or more. Wholesale prices were touted on its website as “very competitive.” The company also sold a selection of coffees for personal use that could be ordered on the website at $12.40–$16.95 per pound (454 grams). Other cafés competed with Receiver in PEI, such as Kettle Black (“Charlottetown’s local café and roastery”) and Samuel’s Coffeehouse (“Focused on blending our rich island heritage with modern ideas”). These cafés often did their own roasting and may have had wholesale customers as well, though some did not. Samuel’s Coffeehouse, for example, did not do its own roasting and served Java Blend’s coffee—but was looking into roasting in the future. THE CUSTOMERS Receiver’s sales were highly seasonal, and the busy season was from June to October. PEI was a tourist destination, which drove not only its own café sales but also sales of local wholesale customers. Wholesale customers in 2018 largely consisted of local cafés and markets. A more diverse wholesale customer base would have smoothed some of this variation in demand, but, as of 2018, Receiver had not penetrated other markets or types of customers, with the exception of the University of Prince Edward Island, which had replaced Starbucks’ coffee with Receiver’s products in 2017. The university sales helped offset some of the drop in sales when tourist season ended.

Most wholesale customers were based in PEI, and demand within the province amounted to 75 per cent of wholesale revenue. Receiver also supplied two cafés in Nova Scotia and made sales through its website and coffee subscription services; for example, Secret Sip, a Canadian company that sent a different selection of coffees to customers each month, sourced from roasters across the country.

Retailers such as grocery stores were of little interest to Receiver, as they were not a good fit with the product and brand. Specialty coffee in grocery stores did not sell quickly enough given the coffee’s short shelf life; therefore, as MacKay claimed, “. . . high-end is not usually in grocery.” Typical grocery store practice also did not match well with Receiver. According to MacKay, in grocery stores, “. . . you have to go in and take care of your own product” in terms of stocking shelves and maintaining inventory, which was more than Receiver was looking into doing at that point.

Au th

or iz

ed fo

r u se

o nl

y by

A lin

a Fa

ur in

M an

ge tin

g M

an ag

em en

t 6 21

a t U

ni ve

rs ity

C an

ad a

W es

t f ro

m J

ul 2

0, 2

02 0

to O

ct 1

1, 2

02 0.

U se

o ut

si de

th es

e pa

ra m

et er

s is

a c

op yr

ig ht

v io

la tio

n.

 

 

Page 6 9B20A010 The goal for 2018 and beyond was to get Receiver’s products into more cafés in the Maritimes and to begin expanding into Ontario and Quebec. (Information about cities in the Maritimes and their distance from Charlottetown is shown in Exhibit 1.) Ontario and Quebec were much more populous; in Ontario there were 22 cities with populations larger than Charlottetown, and in Quebec there were 13. MacKay was focusing on Canada because it was “the path of least resistance,” and it had been in talks with cafés in Toronto and Vancouver. A group of entrepreneurs in Moncton, New Brunswick, was looking to open a café and had approached Receiver about being their wholesale supplier. MacKay explained that, largely due to past success with such customers, “We are trying to target people opening new cafés before they pick their beans.” Selling in already-established cafés was more difficult because, according to MacKay, “. . . people are brand loyal and unwilling to switch.” With this target in mind, Receiver’s management began cold-calling prospective customers to establish a relationship with them. Unfortunately, however, this proved challenging. Receiver had a positive reputation that spanned the country; because so many Canadians had visited PEI, and many tourists had visited Receiver, there were people in all parts of Canada who knew and liked the brand. This alone, however, was insufficient to drive sales. The issue was, in MacKay’s words, that “. . . we don’t always know the channels to get the wholesale customers.” A promising prospective customer was a “multi-roaster” café that sold coffees from multiple wholesale roasters like Receiver. If its coffee sold well in these establishments, Receiver could become a regular supplier, though this had not proven successful thus far. “It’s a two-part problem,” MacKay said, “because we have to sell it to the cafés to get it to the customers. Those that like coffee like Receiver a lot, and they will get their hands on it.” Hiring a third-party salesperson was an option; however, it was considered expensive, and without guaranteed returns, it would be hard to justify the multi-year investment during the growth period, especially given Receiver’s tight marketing budget. The company had allocated only about $10,000– $15,000 annually for marketing activities over the previous few years, and this was unlikely to change going forward. The three partners were certain of the nature of the growth they were looking for, specifically that it would be in wholesale. They had no desire to open café locations outside of PEI, they were not willingness to franchise, and it was critical that the brand’s quality be protected. BRAND COMMUNICATIONS The primary method of communicating Receiver’s brand was word of mouth, which MacKay felt had been working well for Receiver. Some advertising was done in mostly local publications—The Buzz, a local arts and culture newspaper, PEI Living magazine, and tourist magazines provided to visitors by local hotels. The ads were mostly about the café locations rather than the wholesale coffee. The company had also been mentioned in high-profile publications, such as Bon Appetit magazine. Other communications activities were fairly limited, with little use of online marketing. Receiver had a website with information about the company and its two café locations, information about its wholesale offerings, and a web store that sold home-use bags of coffee. Receiver’s social media activity included Facebook, where the company had 3,800 likes, 3,850 followers, and a 4.9 out of 5 rating in the reviews. Receiver posted from one to five times per week, with posts consisting of announcements, pictures, and information about events and products. Each of these posts received between 10 and 50 likes and 2–10 comments. Receiver also posted on Twitter (1,185 followers and 520 likes). Up until May 2018, the company was tweeting once per week; however, this virtually

Au th

or iz

ed fo

r u se

o nl

y by

A lin

a Fa

ur in

M an

ge tin

g M

an ag

em en

t 6 21

a t U

ni ve

rs ity

C an

ad a

W es

t f ro

m J

ul 2

0, 2

02 0

to O

ct 1

1, 2

02 0.

U se

o ut

si de

th es

e pa

ra m

et er

s is

a c

op yr

ig ht

v io

la tio

n.

 

 

Page 7 9B20A010 stopped, with only one tweet in the subsequent four months. Tweets generally consisted of generic reasons to purchase food or beverages from Receiver. Each tweet received at most three likes and, sometimes, one comment. Receiver’s Instagram account (8,200 followers across two accounts, one for Receiver and one for The Brass Shop) was active with one or two posts per day and consisted of images of products and/or staff. Each post received between 60 and 250 likes and the occasional comment. The company website had links to each social media account on each webpage. The cafés also received good online reviews, with 4.5 stars out of 5 on both TripAdvisor and Yelp. To MacKay, the Receiver brand represented “. . . quality and community, and we build the rest of the business around that.” Importance was placed on factors such as the locations from where the coffee beans were sourced, how channel partners were treated, and that business was being conducted in an ethical and sustainable way. MacKay explained, “. . . these are the people that allow us to be in business.” As for how customers saw the brand, she said, “. . . people would call us ‘hipster,’ but not in a derogatory way. We’re not at all frilly, we’re more of a welcoming ‘mom-and-pop’ shop.” How this brand message resonated with prospective wholesale customers was less clear, as most of those who bought wholesale coffee did so to support their own brand and to increase their own revenues and profits. Finding a way to incorporate the Receiver brand identity into another café’s own positioning was a new way to approach the issue of expanding wholesale sales, and likely a necessary one. THE WHOLESALE CHALLENGE “I wasn’t much of a coffee drinker but, as the ‘average customer,’ I was sold on specialty coffee because of Receiver’s quality, and now I’m addicted,” MacKay said. Receiver was growing well, with each year bringing new challenges and opportunities for growth. MacKay, Francis, and Bruinooge were certain that a larger market outside of PEI was attainable, but with heavy competition both within the Maritimes and elsewhere, as well as a limited budget of only $15,000, the task was daunting. “How do we move wholesale beyond our own borders?” MacKay asked. She and her partners were clear on where they wanted to go, but they did not know how to get there. Would Receiver be able to “brew something up” to succeed, or would the plans be “roasted and ground up”?

 

This case was originally written for the 2019 Vanier College Case Challenge. The author thanks them for their assistance and guidance in its creation.

Au th

or iz

ed fo

r u se

o nl

y by

A lin

a Fa

ur in

M an

ge tin

g M

an ag

em en

t 6 21

a t U

ni ve

rs ity

C an

ad a

W es

t f ro

m J

ul 2

0, 2

02 0

to O

ct 1

1, 2

02 0.

U se

o ut

si de

th es

e pa

ra m

et er

s is

a c

op yr

ig ht

v io

la tio

n.

 

 

Page 8 9B20A010

EXHIBIT 1: INFORMATION ABOUT CITIES IN THE MARITIMES

City Population* Distance from Charlottetown (km)** Halifax, Nova Scotia 403,390 332 St. John’s, Newfoundland 205,955 1,029 Moncton, New Brunswick 144,810 165 Saint John, New Brunswick 126,202 402 Fredericton, New Brunswick 101,760 343 Cape Breton, Nova Scotia 98,722 354 Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island 69,325 n/a Truro, Nova Scotia 45,753 236 New Glasgow, Nova Scotia 34,487 102 Corner Brook, Newfoundland 31,917 748

Note: *Statistics Canada, “Data Products, 2016 Census,” accessed October 10, 2019, www12.statcan.gc.ca/census- recensement/2016/dp-pd/index-eng.cfm; **Driving (plus ferry when needed) distances obtained from Google Maps, accessed October 10, 2019, www.google.ca/maps. Source: Compiled by the case author.

Au th

or iz

ed fo

r u se

o nl

y by

A lin

a Fa

ur in

M an

ge tin

g M

an ag

em en

t 6 21

a t U

ni ve

rs ity

C an

ad a

W es

t f ro

m J

ul 2

0, 2

02 0

to O

ct 1

1, 2

02 0.

U se

o ut

si de

th es

e pa

ra m

et er

s is

a c

op yr

ig ht

v io

la tio

n.