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Hard Bodies is a new entrant to the local health club scene. The owners of Hard Bodies realize that profit can be increased through price discrimination. Accordingly, the firm employs several different pricing schemes. For each of the following schemes explain whether it is price discrimination and, if so, what degree of price discrimination it is. a. An annual membership to the club sells at a 50 percent discount of the total rate charged customers who choose to pay on a month-by-month basis (e.g., the annual fee is $300 while the regular monthly rate is $50). b. Obese customers weighing at least 300 pounds get a 20 percent discount on all regular rates. c. Spouses of members belonging to the club qualify for a 30 percent discount on all regular rates. d. Hard Bodies offers to beat (through a 20 percent discount) any rate that a customer is offered by a rival health club.

 
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A video game producer has costs of $25,000 per month that are fixed with regard to output. The firm’s marginal cost is $5 per unit of output for output between 1 and 15,000 units. Information available from the market research group indicates that 15,000 units could be sold each month in the firm’s primary market if the price was set at $6.80 per unit and that 14,000 units could be sold at $7 per unit. The market research group also suggests that it is reasonable to assume that priceand quantity demanded have a linear relationship in this market not only between those two points, but also well beyond them

. a. One officer of the firm feels that price should be set at the level that would maximize revenue. At what price would this objective be accomplished? What would price elasticity and marginal revenue be at this price? Is this the price the firm should establish? Why or why not?

 b. Other officers are concerned with profit. What price should be set to maximize profit? What output will prevail in the market at this price? What would price elasticity and marginal revenue be at this price? What is the profit? The firm has the opportunity to sell in a second market that is separated from the first in such a way that buyers in one market cannot resell to buyers in the other market. For the second market, the market research group has estimated the demand relationship to be: P Q 2 2 = −7 0 00001 . , where P2 is the price in the second market and Q2 is the quantity of the firm’s product sold in that market each month

. c. Some officers of the firm believe this second market offers an opportunity for additional profit. They argue that if production is constrained to 15,000 units, the limit within which marginal cost is $5, it is worthwhile to sell some of these units in the second market. Should the firm sell any units in this market? Should it sell only units that would not be absorbed in the primary market at the profit-maximizing price? Should it divert some units from the primary to the secondary market? What price would you set in each market? What are the elasticity and marginal revenue in each market? What is the profit if your policy suggestion is followed? How much profit do you attribute to each market? Explain why your suggestion is the best policy.

 d. One of the firm’s production managers has pointed out that 15,000 units of output per month is not the absolute limit on production. The physical limit, she points out, may be closer to 30,000 units. The problem is that for each unit of output above the 15,000-unit level, marginal cost will rise by $0.001, so that unit 15,001 will increase total cost by $5.001, unit 15,002 will increase it by $5.002, and so on. She wonders if the two markets together could not advantageously absorb more than 15,000 units considering this production situation. What total output do you recommend? How much should go into each market? Is it worthwhile to push beyond 15,000 units of output per month? Why or why not?

 
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You run a rather plush ride concession at an amusement park. It costs you $500 per day to have the ride available to patrons of the park. For each rider you have, the incremental cost is $1. The patrons of the park appear to fall into two groups. Members of the first group are not concerned with taking a variety of rides but are quite responsive to ride price and will take the same ride many times. Members of the second group like variety in their rides and will pay a good deal to have at least one turn on a particular ride. The daily demand for rides on your concession by a patron of the park in each of the two groups is shown in the table

You run a rather plush ride concession at an amusement park. It costs you $500 per day to have the...

Each day each group includes about 100 patrons.

 a. If the amusement park limits you to a one-part pricing structure consisting of a price per ride that is the same for every ride taken, what price will you charge?

 b. If you could charge a two-part tariff consisting of a fee for access to your concession plus a charge for each ride taken, then what access fee and ride charge would you set? How much would you be willing to pay to the amusement park’s owners to permit you to use this pricing structure?

 c. If you could charge each patron a declining amount for each ride the patron took—that is, $3 for the first ride, $2.50 for the second, and so on—could you do better for yourself and for the amusement park than you could with either a single price or a two-part tariff? Explain why or why not.

 
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Suppose that Iran and Iraq are Cournot duopolists in the crude oil market and face the following market demand function: P qq = −+ 100 1 2 ( ), where qi represents the output levels of the two countries with Iran being 1 and Iraq being 2, and P is the per-barrel price. The marginal revenue schedules facing the two countries are: MR q q MR q q 1 1 2 2 2 1 100 2 100 2 = −− =−− and . Each country has a marginal cost curve of the form: MC q i i = , where i = 1, 2. a. Determine each country’s reaction function. b. Does a Cournot equilibrium exist? If so, find the outputs and prices of crude oil in the two countries. c. Suppose that the two countries collude and become a cartel. What will be the resulting price and outputs for crude oil for the two countries? [Note that the market marginal revenue is 100 − 2(q1 + q2).] d. Can it be said that because collusive profits are strictly greater, it is true that these countries should necessarily collude? Are there any potential pitfalls in such a collusive arrangement?

 
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