MANDATORY OUTLINE FOR CASE ANALYSIS

MANDATORY OUTLINE FOR CASE ANALYSIS

Note: Structure your analysis, use headings and subheadings, do not write an essay.

Name (or names if a team) Date:

Case Name:

I. Major Facts

State here the major facts as you see them. Make statements clear and concise for your own understanding as well as for the understanding of the other students and the instructor.

II. Major Problem

State here the major problem as you see it. Emphasize the present major problem. You may wish to phrase your statement in the form of a question. In a few cases, there may be more than one major problem. A good problem statement will be concise, usually only one sentence.

III. Possible Solutions/Alternatives

A. List here the possible solutions to the major problem. Let your imagination come up with alternative ways to solve the problem.

B. Do not limit yourself to only one or two possible solutions. These solutions should be distinct from each other.

C. However, you may wish to include portions of one solution in another solution, as long as each solution stands alone. Only in this manner will your subsequent choice be definitive.

D. Briefly note advantages and disadvantages of each possible solution, etc.

IV. Choice and Rationale

State here your choice, A or B or ___ and the detailed reasons for your choice. You may also state your reasons for not choosing the other alterative solutions.

V. Implementation/The Action Plan

Who does what, where, how, when, etc.

(When requested, prepare a plan to implement your choice)

 
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Zara-Rapid Fire Fulfillment

Zara is the flagship brand for Europe’s fastest growing apparel retailer and has about 1500 stores in major cities around the globe.

For this assessment, consider that you work as a manager in Zara’s corporate organization. Zara’s leadership team is considering changes in their supply chain management practices, and your manager asked you to prepare a report that analyzes their current practices as input to their decision-making process

. Your report will be reviewed by the overall leadership team. After conducting some research on the topic, you identified a highly useful resource, which is a summary of Zara’s supply chain management practices provided in the Harvard Business Review article, “Rapid Fire Fulfillment,” (linked in the Resources under the Required Resources heading). Your manager agreed with you about that resource being highly useful, and the two of you further agreed that your report should address the following key questions as items Zara’s leadership team will be interested in:

  • Analyze and explain why the company’s supply chain strategy is successful. As part of that, examine the effect of  the selection and management of suppliers and determination of information needs and systems.
  • Analyze the importance of the company’s fast response and information infrastructure as related to the company’s supply chain strategy. For example, what advantage does Zara gain against the competition by having a very responsive supply chain? What information infrastructure does Zara need in order to operate its production, distribution, and fast fashion retail network effectively?
  • Analyze how the company’s unique replenishment strategy satisfies customers. For example, what advantage does the company gain from replenishing its stores multiple times a week compared to a less frequent schedule? How does the frequency of replenishment affect the improved customer satisfaction?
  • What information infrastructure does Zara need in order to operate its production, distribution, and fast fashion retail network effectively?

Based on a leadership team audience, your report should be well organized and written in clear, succinct language. Target 600–800 words. Attributing sources in your professional and academic work supports your analysis and conclusions and demonstrates ethical behavior and academic honesty. Following APA rules for attributing sources provides consistency and ensures that readers can locate original sources if desired.

Academic Integrity and APA Formatting

As a reminder related to using APA rules to ensure academic honesty:

  1. When using a direct quote (using exact or nearly exact wording), you must enclose the quoted wording in quotation marks, immediately followed by an in-text citation. The source must then be listed in your references page.
  2. When paraphrasing (using your own words to describe a non-original idea), the paraphrased idea must be immediately followed by an in-text citation and the source must be listed in your references page.
 
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Operations Management Assignment

Operations Management Assignment/ one page
APA REFERENCE

Inventory is a necessary element for customer service. However, it implies an additional cost that can become unsustainable for an organization.

Read the article inventory – INVENTORY – DRIVEN COSTS *pls view attached *and answer the following questions:

  • Is HP’s focus on minimizing inventory costs is feasible for a company operating in a market where delivery speed is an order-winning factor?
  • Would you pay a premium for a product or service price for an earlier delivery? For which type of products or services?

Calloni, G., de Montgros, X., Slagmulder, R., Van Wassenhove, L., Wright, L. (2005). Inventory-Driven Costs.  Harvard Business Review.  Retrieved from: https://hbr.org/2005/03/inventory-driven-cost

ECONOMY

by Gianpaolo Callioni, Xavier de Montgros, Regine Slagmulder, Luk N. Van Wassenhove, and Linda

Wright

FROM THE MARCH 2005 ISSUE

he 1990s were hard for the PC business. Although demand grew �vefold between 1990 and

1997, the products had become household staples, and it was di cult for companies to

di!erentiate their o!erings.

Hewlett-Packard came out better than many. The computer hardware giant slashed prices on all of

its PCs: 10% in 1991, another 26% in 1992, and yet another 22% in 1993. At the same time, it

revamped its design, planning, and production processes to shorten cycle times, respond quickly to

changes in demand, and move inventory to the right location as it was needed. By late 1999, HP had

displaced IBM as the world’s third-largest PC manufacturer in terms of revenue, behind Dell and

Compaq.

But for all its success in maintaining market share, HP was struggling to turn a dollar. By 1997,

margins on its PCs were as thin as a silicon wafer, and some product lines had not turned a pro�t

since 1993. Price cuts made formerly insigni�cant costs critical—computer manufacturers simply

could not stock up on components or any other inventory. Any excess at the end of a product’s short

life had to be written o!, further eroding margins. Adding to the pressure, constant technology

advances made new products obsolete in as few as six months. A common rule of thumb was that

the value of a fully assembled PC decreased at the rate of 1% a week. Although HP’s supply chains

were 4exible and responsive enough to deliver the PCs when and where customers wanted them,

they were not economically sustainable.

Compounding the problem, company executives realized, was the fact that HP’s management-

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accounting metrics had failed to keep pace with the evolution of its supply chains. HP now oversaw

a complex, multitiered manufacturing network made up of many disparate entities. But the

company’s current approach to cost measurement allowed individual players in the chain to see

only their piece of the puzzle, making it impossible for them to assess the overall dollar impact of

their local decisions. They could not see the e!ects of operational decisions like setting the size of

bu!er inventory between two sections of the production process. Nor could they assess the impact

of such strategic decisions as choosing to locate a �nal assembly plant close to a particular supplier.

If the company wanted to design sustainable supply chains, it needed to give all its managers a

direct line of sight to the overall bottom line.

The Hidden Cost of Inventory

To make the PC business more cost competitive, HP’s Strategic Planning and Modeling (SPaM)

group, led by Corey Billington, undertook an exhaustive review of the PC business’s overall cost

structure in 1997. It soon became clear that mismatches between demand and supply leading to

excess inventory were themain drivers of PC costs; in 1995, for example, costs related to inventory

had equaled the PC business’s total operating margin. It was just as clear that the division’s existing

cost metrics did not track all of HP’s inventory-driven costs (IDC), pieces of which were often mixed

in with other cost items, scattered over di!erent functions and geographic locations, and recorded

at di!erent times using di!erent accounting conventions.

The most readily identi�able component of inventory-driven costs is the traditional inventory cost

item, usually de�ned as the “holding cost of inventory,” which covers both the capital cost of money

tied up in inventory and the physical costs of having inventory (warehouse space costs, storage

taxes, insurance, rework, breakage, spoilage). At HP, however, the holding cost accounted for less

than 10% of total inventory-driven costs. SPaM’s investigation revealed four other inventory-driven

cost items at HP’s PC business. And each of them needed to be managed in a distinct way.

Excess inventory was the main driver of Hewlett-Packard’s PC costs; one year, in fact, inventory-driven costs equaled the PC business’s total operating margin.

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Component Devaluation Costs.

According to SPaM’s calculations, these accounted for the lion’s share of HP’s inventory costs. Key

components such as microprocessor chips and memory typically drop in price quickly and steeply.

The price of a CPU, for instance, might fall as much as 40% during its nine-month life cycle, and the

penalties for holding excess parts when a price drop occurred could be enormous. Back in 1997,

however, few electronic hardware makers had realized just how perishable their goods had become,

and HP, in common with many others, maintained inventory in several places—in factories and

distribution centers, in merge centers, in transit. Every time the component prices fell, HP was hit

with another devaluation cost at each of these points in the value chain.

HP had no control over component prices, but it could control how much inventory it was holding.

That meant reducing the number of nodes in the supply chain, consolidating manufacturing

facilities, taking possession of components on a just-in-time basis, paying the going price at that

time, and working with suppliers to minimize inventory when a price drop was anticipated.

Price Protection Costs.

If HP dropped the market price of a product after units had already been shipped to a sales channel,

it had to reimburse its channel partners for the di!erence for any units that had not yet sold, so the

channel partner didn’t have to sell at a loss. Given how quickly value decayed, this mismatched

inventory exposed HP to big price protection risks. A channel partner might buy a product from HP

when the prevailing market price was $1,000. But if the item sold �ve weeks later at a new price of

$950, HP had to reimburse the $50 di!erence. To limit this cost, HP had to be certain that channel

partners’ inventory never exceeded the minimum number of days required to ensure the desired

availability, so that no excess inventory had to be protected.This meant that Hewlett-Packard had to

keep its manufacturing turnaround times short and replenishment cycles frequent. HP also o!ered

its channel partners incentives to carry the lower levels of inventory. Analysis showed that the cost

of these incentives was almost always lower than the cost of reimbursing channel partners after

price breaks.

Product Return Costs.

In a sense, product return costs are simply 100% price protection costs; distributors can simply

return unsold goods to the manufacturer for a full refund. In some cases, product returns

constituted more than 10% of the product’s revenue, not because of product failures but because

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resellers were returning excess inventory. Apart from incurring the operational costs (shipping,

handling, product retesting, and the like), returns lengthened the time a product spent in the supply

chain before reaching an end user, increasing HP’s exposure to additional devaluation risks and

inventory �nance costs. To manage this type of inventory-driven cost, HP had to work closely with

channel partners to optimize the whole supply chain. By agreeing with its channel partners on

speci�c inventory levels and delivery expectations, HP reduced ine cient inventory in the channel

and increased its overall quality of service both to partners and end customers.

Obsolescence Costs.

End-of-life write-o!s were initially the most obvious portion of this cost. PC life cycles being so

short, even a small miscalculation in anticipated demand could leave the company holding stacks of

worthless goods that had to be written o!. The other related but sometimes less obvious

components of obsolescence costs were discounts on about-to-be-discontinued products and the

associated marketing e!ort required to accelerate their sale. These costs are typically not included

in a company’s cost of goods sold and, although HP executives took these discounts and marketing

costs into account when making decisions about discontinuing product lines, they seldom

considered them when determining the real cost of inventory. To avoid obsolescence costs, HP had

to be very e cient in managing product introductions, so that new models were launched just as

the last remaining units of the old models sold out.

On the whole, calculating these components of inventory costs is fairly straightforward. The

simplest to determine is devaluation, which can be �gured by multiplying the inventory level of the

product or component in question by the proper devaluation rate. Suppose that a hypothetical

company sells a consumer electronic item that devalues at a yearly rate of 60%. Average annual

inventory related to the product is worth $200 million, and annual revenues from selling the

product are $1 billion. Then, the yearly inventory-related cost due to product devaluation is the

average annual inventory multiplied by the devaluation rate, or $120 million. Dividing that �gure by

revenues gives us the cost as a margin, in this case 12%. Clearly, at any given devaluation rate,

inventory costs will increase directly as inventory increases. The faster prices fall, the more the

inventory-driven costs rise as inventory increases. Since in most cases the devaluation rate is

outside managerial control, the only way to reduce the impact of devaluation on pro�ts is to do a

better job of matching demand and supply, thereby shrinking inventories.

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Tracing Costs to the Source

Price protection and return costs are calculated in a similar way, but the actual sums are somewhat

more complicated because they depend on the contractual agreements set up between

manufacturers and distributors. In its simplest case, if a manufacturer has agreed to reimburse its

distributors 100% whenever it lowers its list price, the formula for determining price protection

costs is the price drop times the number of units of the product in distributors’ inventory. Similarly,

return costs would be the number of items returned of a particular product times the wholesale

price paid by the retailer in the �rst place. But those sums need to be adjusted by the contract terms,

which might, for example, not allow all inventory to be returned if the retailer deliberately

overstocks. (The more generous the price-protection and return terms, the less the distributor will

lose by doing so.) What’s more, contract enforcement may depend on speci�c circumstances. For

example, even if the contract constrains the return options of the channel partner, HP may still

agree to take products back to maintain good relations and secure future sales.

Devaluation, price protection, and return costs are essentially continuous costs; they occur all the

time and can be calculated at any point. Obsolescence costs, however, are discrete, arising only

when a company decides to retire a particular product and therefore cannot be estimated until that

moment. The amount of obsolescence costs is determined by several factors. First, the company

needs to write o! 100% of the value of �nished goods in its inventories (less any recycling or scrap

bene�ts). Then it must write down the value of any components in the pipeline. If components are

product speci�c, they will have to be written o! 100%; those that can be used elsewhere will be

subject to devaluation costs depending on how quickly they can be transferred to other products.

Finally, the company has to add in the related marketing and discounting costs of selling o!

about-to-be discontinued products in �re sales.

As important as identifying the various hidden components of inventory costs was to HP, even more

powerful was understanding how the impact of each IDC component di!ered for di!erent products.

That had profound implications for the way HP managed its product portfolio. This insight is

illustrated in the table “Tracing Costs to the Source,” which compares three unnamed HP products.

Total IDC is relatively high for product A, at 14.25% of product revenues, and fully half of this total

comes from price protection costs. Total IDC for product C, by contrast, is only 4.80% of revenues,

and the largest share of that is component devaluation.

These �gures suggest how the supply chains of

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When the components of inventory costs are

broken out, it becomes easy to see how the supply

chains of different products need to be adjusted

in different ways to lower costs at their source. In

this example of three of Hewlett-Packard’s

products, the highest costs for product A are

coming from goods whose prices have dropped

after they’ve been shipped to retailers. But the

greatest problem for products B and C are drops

in component prices before the products ever get

out of the factory.

the three products need to be managed. Since the

inventories of channel partners represent the

largest component of inventory costs for product

A, what managers need to do is improve supply

chain management downstream: They must do a

better job of forecasting demand. They need to

encourage vendor-managed inventory (VMI) and

collaborative planning, forecasting, and

replenishment (CPFR) initiatives. By contrast,

products B and C probably need better upstream

management with suppliers or with product

designers to reduce component devaluation risks.

The four cost items that SPaM identi�ed are not

the only kinds of potential inventory-driven costs.

Companies that maintain high stocks of raw

materials, for instance, may well �nd that the write-down in the value of their inventory, stemming

from reductions in raw material prices, can in any one year outweigh the bene�ts of the lower input

prices. Another common source of IDC are price discounts, which typically arise when errors in

forecasting demand lead to excess inventory that the company is forced to sell at below-market

prices, resulting in lower margins on the products in question.

The Turnaround

The Mobile Computing Division (MCD) was the �rst of Hewlett-Packard’s PC units to take inventory-

driven costs into account when formulating strategy. In 1998, before redesigning its supply chain,

MCD was taping dollars to every machine it shipped. Year after year, its managers tried di!erent

initiatives to improve pro�ts, including reducing the cost of materials, controlling operating

expenses, and generating revenue growth through new product development. Nothing worked until

the notebook division began to look at the impact of its supply chain decisions on IDC.

Intuitively, MCD’s managers believed that the unit could not become pro�table until it consolidated

all worldwide manufacturing at a single location and shipped the �nished products directly to

customers. This would, however, represent a major strategic change, and the division’s executives

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Finding the Lowest-Cost Option

Breaking out inventory-driven costs gave HP’s

Mobile Computing Division a far more

comprehensive understanding of the various

supply chain options it was considering. Scenario

1 represents the existing cost structure of the

unit’s business in 1998, in which products were

manufactured centrally and configured to

conform to local needs in regional markets.

Scenario 5 is the centralized one-step

manufacturing model that HP eventually

adopted. Its merits do not become apparent until

inventory-driven costs are taken into account.

worried that centralized manufacturing would a!ect the unit’s ability to give customers the service

they wanted, resulting in the loss of both market share and revenue. To build a compelling case for

making the move, they needed to quantify the risk—and the opportunity—involved in making such a

radical change.

Collaborating with SPaM, the MCD team considered many di!erent supply chain scenarios. The

exhibit “Finding the Lowest-Cost Option” compares �ve of these. For reasons of con�dentiality, the

actual numbers have been disguised, but the exhibit truthfully reveals the relative cost di!erences.

Scenario 1 represents the original con�guration, a two-step supply chain with a central

manufacturing facility and a certain amount of local product con�guration carried out at regional

facilities. It turns out that about 40% of the true total supply chain cost in this scenario is linked to

inventory. The company had never taken inventory costs such as devaluation and obsolescence fully

into account before, so the exercise revealed just how expensive its past supply chain decisions had

actually been.

Scenarios 2 and 3 essentially retain the basic

two-step supply chain con�guration of scenario 1

but assume that the company will limit inventory

costs by putting more-e cient manufacturing

processes in place and by passing on to supply

chain partners as much responsibility as possible

for inventories. As the exhibit shows, these

nonstrategic changes would su ce to reduce total

costs (including IDC) by as much as 24%. In

scenarios 4 and 5, the unit considered radically

restructuring its supply chain, and either

approach would involve major strategic changes

to implement. Both are essentially one-step

supply chains, but there the similarities end.

Scenario 4 assumes that HP would have several

regional factories doing both manufacturing and

localized con�gurations. In scenario 5, however,

everything would be done in a single central

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factory and airfreighted directly to customers

worldwide. What this means is that scenario 4 has

higher manufacturing costs than scenario 5 but lower freight costs.

How should the Mobile Computing Division choose between the scenarios? In terms of

manufacturing costs only, scenario 5, which MCD called International Direct Ship, is the best option,

suggesting that the company should consider making the radical change to a one-step supply chain.

Factoring in freight, the one-step model remains the theoretically optimal supply chain, although

scenario 4, with regional factories, now appears to be the best option. But the case for switching to a

one-step model is considerably undermined because scenario 3, the best-case two-step option, is

now only one percentage point more expensive than scenario 4 and actually cheaper than scenario

5. The one percentage point di!erence is not enough to make up for the organizational and �nancial

changes that switching to a one-step supply chain would involve, despite the tight margins on the

PC business.

But what a di!erent picture emerges when IDCs such as inventory devaluation and obsolescence

costs are fully quanti�ed and included in the analysis. Then, the case for switching to a one-step

supply chain looks much stronger. Even if the company were to exploit all the possible opportunities

for reducing IDC in the current supply chain structure, as scenario 3 rather unrealistically assumes,

both one-step scenarios come out about four percentage points cheaper, which is enough to justify

management’s case for switching to a one-step supply chain. A full assessment of IDC, therefore, not

only revealed the limitations of MCD’s current supply chain but also provided strong evidence that

the only way the division could turn its business around was by refashioning its entire supply chain

strategy.

IDC considerations also drove the choice between the unit’s two very di!erent one-step supply

chain alternatives. As the exhibit shows, the total cost di!erence between them, when IDCs were

taken into account, was minimal (0.2 percentage points). But managers felt that scenario 4 o!ered

many opportunities for losing control of inventory-driven costs, and it was not clear that MCD would

always be able to contain those risks. Managing a multitude of regional factories with separate pools

of materials and products is harder than managing just the one. More factories would mean greater

chances that capacity would fall idle; several plants would certainly require higher levels of capital

investment than a single one. And when MCD introduced new products, several factories would

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have to ramp up their production processes, not just one. So, although scenarios 4 and 5 seemed to

be very similar in terms of base-case total costs, the Mobile Computing Division eventually plumped

for scenario 5.

MCD started reaping the bene�ts almost at once. Inventory-driven costs dropped from 18.7% of

total revenue in 1997 to 12.2% in 1998. In 1999, the division saw an even more dramatic

improvement, as IDC dropped to a mere 3.8% of revenue. These reductions translated directly into

savings for the notebook division’s bottom line, which in 1998 broke even and in 1999 turned

pro�table. The IDC metrics enabled the Mobile Computing Division to clearly identify exactly where

changes to its supply chain were needed and to justify changes that, according to more traditional

thinking, would not have made sense.

Other PC units, notably the commercial desktop business, started to follow MCD’s approach to

costing in their supply chain decisions, with similarly impressive results. Inspired by these

successes, HP decided to o cially implement the new metrics in all of its PC operations. In the �rst

stage of the rollout, the focus was on tracking IDC across all divisions. In some cases, the

information had to be assembled manually; in others, it was possible to automate the data

gathering. In the next stage, goals for each IDC line item were set for each region and product line,

based on projects that were known to be in the works and estimates of future market conditions. A

consistent presentation of the data was almost as important as the actual data. HP’s regional units,

product divisions, and �nance groups worked closely together to develop a standard template for

supply chain metrics, making sure that the data could be collected in the requested format for each

line item in a timely manner. So everyone uses the same line items on their spreadsheets, each with

the same de�nition, the same source of information, and the same method of calculation. As a

result, all users can look at a line item and know exactly where the data came from and what they

really mean.

The Payoff

HP can now manage the pro�tability of its value chain in a much more sophisticated way. Gone are

the days of across-the-board measures like “Everyone must cut inventories by 20% by the end of

the year,” which would usually result in a sometimes counterproductive 4urry of cookie-cutter lean

production and just-in-time initiatives. Now each product group is free to choose the supply chain

con�guration that best suits its needs as long as it meets the global IDC target. Product group

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managers may well have known before, on an intuitive level, what they needed to do, but the IDC

metrics have made it easier for them to convince senior managers that their particular situations

require particular solutions.

Incorporating the IDC metrics into decision making has also saved managers from moves that make

perfect sense for their own unit but add to overall costs. Previously, for example, a manager might

have decided against shipping goods by air because the extra transportation costs would have

exceeded the identi�able cost of �nancing and warehousing local inventory. But that decision would

have imposed costs elsewhere in the supply chain, which might well have exceeded the extra

transportation costs. Without measuring total IDC, there was no way to know that, and even if the

manager made the right decision, he would probably have been penalized for it. Now, however, he

would be rewarded for incurring extra local cost in the interests of reducing total costs.

The IDC metrics are valuable in a whole range of R&D and marketing decisions. Many downstream

supply chain costs arise because of choices managers make upstream in the product design phase.

The IDC discipline has made HP’s product designers much more aware of the consequences of their

decisions, which makes them more responsible and accountable. Before, someone who had

speci�ed a hard drive that took three months to obtain would probably not have realized that during

those months HP was liable for excess inventory, devaluation, and obsolescence costs. Now, such a

designer no longer has that excuse. The IDC metrics also help managers decide how much 4exibility

to build into new products. In the past, HP often underestimated the related supply chain costs of

o!ering lots of product features. Being able to quantify the real inventory-driven cost of adding, say,

Lithuanian language customization to a product helps in determining whether or not to o!er

customers that option.

But perhaps the greatest bene�t of the IDC metrics is that they link operational decisions to

corporate goals for creating shareholder value. In the new pro�t-focused climate, HP has been

abandoning its traditional �nancial-performance metric of return on sales in favor of return on net

assets (RONA). This re4ects the competitive reality that, for companies like HP, advantage derives

less from market share than from how e ciently the �rm manages its assets—in other words, its

supply chain. As the exhibit “Linking Inventory Costs to Financial Performance” shows, the

relationship between inventory-driven costs and return on net assets is direct, simple, and powerful,

which makes it far easier to align the interests and decisions of managers up and down the

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Linking Inventory Costs to Financial Performance

Hewlett-Packard is finding that return on net

assets (RONA) is a more accurate measure of

shareholder value than market share, because in

such price-sensitive industries, the key to

financial health is not revenue growth but sound

asset management. To measure RONA accurately,

companies need to track more than just

traditional inventory costs. Those costs affect

expenses only, but the price protection and

product return costs that inventory-driven cost

metrics track can also erode revenues. What’s

more, lowering inventory-driven costs can not

only decrease total costs and raise revenues but

also lower working capital requirements by

reducing the number of days of inventory

outstanding.

hierarchy.

The �nancial bene�ts have come quickly. HP’s

Personal Systems Group, for example, saw

worldwide inventory decline by 50% between

2000 and 2002, and it has maintained that level

ever since. Costs associated with inventory have

dropped even further, by some 70%. Since HP’s

merger with Compaq in May 2002, the push to

adopt IDC companywide has moved forward. At

this point, all of HP has adopted a standard set of

inventory-driven cost metrics.• • •

Hewlett-Packard isn’t the only company, of

course, that operates in a dynamic, highly price-

competitive industry. Consumer electronics,

fashion producers, and fresh-goods retailers all

face similar challenges. Any company with low

margins, short life cycles, highly perishable or

seasonal products, and unpredictable demand

needs to track the various components of its

inventory-driven costs. Without appropriate

performance metrics to help visualize the

magnitude of their supply chain problems and to

prompt people to take action, these �rms will simply not know if they are leaving hefty piles of

money on the table.

A version of this article appeared in the March 2005 issue of Harvard Business Review.

Gianpaolo Callioni ([email protected]) is the director of supply chain strategy and planning at Hewlett-Packard in

Palo Alto, California.

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Xavier de Montgros ([email protected]) is the supply chain development director of HP’s Personal Systems

Group.

Regine Slagmulder ([email protected]) is an associate professor at Insead in Fontainebleau, France.

Luk N. Van Wassenhove is the Henry Ford Chair of Manufacturing at INSEAD and director of the Humanitarian

Research Group. He is also an Academic Fellow at the European Center for Executive Development (CEDEP).

Linda Wright ([email protected]) is a finance manager in HP’s Personal Systems Group.

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Case stuDy Blue Nile and Diamond Retailing1

Case stuDy Blue Nile and Diamond Retailing1

A customer walks into your jewelry store with printouts of diamond selections from Blue Nile, a company that is the largest online retailer of diamonds. The list price for the customer’s desired diamond is only $100 above your total cost for a stone of the same characteristics. Do you let the customer walk, or come down in price to compete?2

This dilemma has faced many jewelers. Some argue that jewelers should lower prices on stones to keep the customer. Future sales and add-on sales such as cus- tom designs, mountings, and repairs can then be used to make additional margins. Others argue that cutting prices to compete sends a negative signal to loyal cus- tomers from the past who may be upset by the fact that they were not given the best price.

As the economy tightened during the holiday sea- son of 2007, the differences in performance between Blue Nile and bricks-and-mortar retailers were startling. In January 2008, Blue Nile reported a 24 percent jump in sales during its fourth quarter. For the same quarter, Tif- fany posted a 2 percent drop in domestic same-store sales, and Zales reported a 9 percent drop. The chief operating officer of Blue Nile, Diane Irvine, stated, “This business is all about taking market share. We look at this type of environment as one of opportunity.”

The Diamond Retailing Industry

For both wholesalers and retailers in the diamond indus- try, 2008 was a very difficult year. It was so bad at the supply end that the dealers’ trade association, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, issued an appeal for the diamond producers to reduce the supply of new gems entering the market in an effort to reduce supply.

However, the world’s largest producer, De Beers, appeared unmoved, refusing to give any commitment to curtail production. The company had recently opened the Voorspoed mine in South Africa, which, when fully operational, could add 800,000 carats a year into an

already oversupplied market. Historically, De Beers had exerted tremendous control over the supply of diamonds, going so far as to purchase large quantities of rough dia- monds from other producers. In 2005, the European Commission forced De Beers to phase out its agreement to buy diamonds from ALROSA, the world’s second largest diamond producer, which accounted for most of the diamond production in Russia. Russia was the sec- ond largest producer of diamonds in the world after Botswana.

Although discount retailers such as Walmart and Costco continued to thrive, the situation was difficult for traditional jewelry retailers. Friedman’s filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in January 2008, followed by Chicago-based Whitehall in June. When it filed for bankruptcy, Friedman was the third largest jewelry chain in North America, with 455 stores, whereas Whitehall ranked fifth, with 375 stores in April 2008. In February 2008, Zales announced a plan to close more than 100 stores that year. This shakeup offered an opportunity for other players to move in and try to gain market share.

With the weakening economy, the third and fourth quarters of 2008 were particularly hard on diamond retailers. Even historically successful players such as Blue Nile, Tiffany, and Zales saw a decline in sales and a significant drop in their share price. As customers tight- ened their belts and cut back on discretionary spending, high-cost purchases such as diamond jewelry were often the first to be postponed. The situation worsened as competition for the shrinking number of customers became fiercer. In such a difficult environment, it was hard to judge which factors could best help different jewelry retailers succeed.

Blue Nile

In December 1998, Mark Vadon, a young consultant, was shopping for an engagement ring and stumbled

1This case was written jointly with Professor Roby Thomas of Elmhurst College. 2Stacey King, “The Internet: Retailers’ New Challenge,” Professional Jeweller Magazine, August 1999.

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104 Chapter 4 • Designing Distribution Networks and Applications to Online Sales

across a company called Internet Diamonds, run by Seattle jeweler Doug Williams. Vadon not only bought a ring but also went into business with Williams in early 1999. The company changed its name to Blue Nile by the end of 1999 because the new name “sounded elegant and upscale,” according to Vadon.

On its website, Blue Nile articulated its philoso- phy as follows: “Offer high-quality diamonds and fine jewelry at outstanding prices. When you visit our web- site, you’ll find extraordinary jewelry, useful guidance, and easy-to-understand jewelry education that’s perfect for your occasion.”

Many customers (especially men) liked the low- pressure selling tactics that focused on education. Besides explaining the four Cs—cut, color, clarity, and carat—Blue Nile allowed customers to “build your own ring.” Starting with the cut they preferred, customers could determine ranges along each of the four Cs and price. Blue Nile then displayed all stones in inventory that fit the customer’s desired profile. Customers selected the stone of their choice, followed by the setting they liked best. Blue Nile also allowed customers to have their questions resolved on the phone by sales reps who did not work on commission. This low-pressure selling approach had great appeal to a segment of the population. In a BusinessWeek article in 2008, Internet entrepreneur Jason Calacanis was quoted as saying that shopping for his engagement ring (for which he spent “tens of thousands of dollars”) on Blue Nile “was the best shopping experience he never had.”3

The company focused on providing good value to its customers. Whereas retail jewelers routinely marked up diamonds by up to 50 percent, Blue Nile kept a lower markup of around 20 percent. Blue Nile believed that it could afford the lower markup because of lower inven- tory and warehousing expense. Unlike jewelry retailers who maintained stores in high-priced areas, Blue Nile had a single warehouse in the United States in which it stocked its entire inventory.

The company strategy was not without hurdles because some customers did not care as much about underpricing the competition. For example, some cus- tomers preferred “a piece of fine jewelry in a robin’s egg blue box with Tiffany on it”4 to getting a price discount. Also, it was not entirely clear that customers would be

willing to spend thousands of dollars on an item they had not seen or touched. To counter this issue, Blue Nile offered a 30-day money back guarantee on items in orig- inal condition.

In 2007, the company launched websites in Canada and the United Kingdom and opened an office in Dublin with local customer service and fulfillment operations. The Dublin office offered free shipping to several countries in Western Europe. The U.S. facility handled international shipping to some countries in the Asia–Pacific region. International sales had increased from $17 million in 2007 to more than $62 million in 2012.

By 2007, Blue Nile had sold more than 70,000 rings larger than a carat, with 25 orders totaling more than $100,000. In June 2007, the company sold a single diamond for $1.5 million. Forbes called it perhaps “the largest consumer purchase in Web history—and also the most unlikely.”5 The stone, larger than 10 carats, had a diameter roughly the size of a penny. Blue Nile did not have the stone in inventory, but its network of suppliers quickly located one on a plane en route from a dealer in New York to a retailer in Italy. The stone was rerouted to Blue Nile headquarters in Seattle and transported in a Brinks armored carrier to the buyer—and the whole pro- cess took only three days.

In February 2014, Blue Nile offered more than 140,000 diamonds on its site. Of these diamonds, more than 50,000 were one carat or larger, with prices up to $2.9 million. Almost 76,000 diamonds on the Blue Nile website were priced higher than $2,500. In 2010, com- pany CEO Diane Irvine said, “We’re not positioned as a discounter. We are selling a very high-end product but selling it for much less.” The 2012 annual report stated that “we aim to limit our diamond offerings to those pos- sessing characteristics associated with high quality.”

In 2012, the company had sales of about $400 mil- lion with a net income of $8.4 million. Although sales had risen, income had dropped relative to 2011. The company had also started to offer a broad range of non- engagement products, including rings, wedding bands, necklaces, pendants, bracelets, and gifts and accessories containing precious metals, diamonds, gemstones, or pearls. The company, however, maintained that the engagement category was its core business.

3Jay Greene, “Blue Nile: No Diamond in the Rough,” BusinessWeek e.biz, May 2000. 4King, “The Internet: Retailers’ New Challenge.” 5Victoria Murphy Barret, “The Digital Diamond District,” Forbes.com, October 2007.

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Chapter 4 • Designing Distribution Networks and Applications to Online Sales 105

Zales

The first Zales Jewelers was established by Morris (M. B.) Zale, William Zale, and Ben Lipshy in 1924. Their marketing strategy was to offer a credit plan of “a penny down and a dollar a week.” Their success allowed them to grow to twelve stores in Oklahoma and Texas by 1941. Over the next four decades, the company grew to hundreds of stores by buying up other stores and smaller chains.

In 1986, the company was purchased in a lever- aged buyout by Peoples Jewelers of Canada and Swarovski International. In 1992, its debt pushed Zales into Chapter 11 bankruptcy for a year. It became a public company again in that decade and operated nearly 2,400 stores by 2005. The company’s divisions included Pierc- ing Pagoda, which ran mall-based kiosks selling jewelry to teenagers; Zales Jewelers, which sold diamond jew- elry for working-class mall shoppers; and the upscale Gordon’s. Bailey Banks & Biddle Fine Jewelers, which offered even pricier products out of fancier malls, was sold by Zale Corporation in November 2007.

Three years of declining market share, lost mostly to discounters such as Walmart and Costco, put pressure on Zales to decide on a makeover by 2005. Zales dumped its lower-value 10-karat gold jewelry and modest-quality diamonds. The goal was to make the jeweler more upscale and fashion conscious, moving away from its promotion-driven, lower-end reputation. Unfortunately, the move was a disaster. There were delays in bringing in new merchandise, and same-store sales dropped. The company lost many of its traditional customers without winning the new ones it desired. It was soon passed by Akron, Ohio-based Sterling (a subsidiary of the Signet Group) as the largest jeweler in the United States. The chief executive officer of Zale Corporation was forced to resign by early 2006.

In August 2006, under a new CEO, Zales started a transition to return to its role as a promotional retailer focused on diamond fashion jewelry and diamond rings. The transition involved selling nearly $50 million in dis- continued inventory from its upscale strategy and an expenditure of $120 million on new inventory. As a result of the inventory write-downs, Zales lost $26.4 million in its quarter ending July 31, 2006.

The company had some success with its new strat- egy but was hurt by the rise in fuel prices and falling home prices in 2007 that made its middle-class custom- ers feel less secure. Its core customers hesitated to buy jewelry as they battled higher prices for food and fuel.

Zales reported a profit of $1.5 million in the quarter end- ing July 31, 2007, but same-store sales fell by 0.5 per- cent. In February 2008, the company announced a plan to close approximately 105 stores, reduce inventory by $100 million, and reduce staff in company headquarters by about 20 percent. The goal of this plan was to enhance the company’s profitability and improve its overall effec- tiveness. After many years of losses, the company finally reported a profit for 2012 (see Table 4-14).

Tiffany

Tiffany opened in 1837 as a stationery and fancy goods emporium in New York City. It published its first catalog in 1845. The company enjoyed tremendous success, with its silver designs in particular becoming popular all over the world. In 1886, Tiffany introduced its now famous “Tiffany setting” for solitaire engagement rings. The Tiffany brand was so strong that it helped set dia- mond and platinum purity standards used all over the world. In 1950, Truman Capote published his best seller Breakfast at Tiffany’s, which was released as a success- ful film in 1961. After more than a century of tremen- dous success with its jewelry and other products, the company went public in 1987.

Tiffany’s high-end products included diamond rings, wedding bands, gemstone jewelry, and gemstone bands with diamonds as the primary gemstone. The com- pany also sold non-gemstone gold, platinum, and ster- ling silver jewelry. Other products included watches and high-end items for the home, such as crystal and sterling silver serving trays. Besides its own designs, Tiffany also sold jewelry designed by Elsa Peretti, Paloma Picasso, the late Jean Schlumberger, and architect Frank Gehry.

By 2012, Tiffany had 275 stores and boutiques all over the world, with about 90 of them in the United States. Of its global outlets, Tiffany had more than 50 in Japan and more than 65 in the rest of the Asia-Pacific region. Stores ranged from 1,300 to 18,000 square feet, with an average of 7,100 square feet. Its flagship store in New York contributed about 10 percent of the company’s sales in 2007. Besides retail outlets, Tiffany also sold products through a website and catalogs. The company, however, did not offer any engagement jewelry through its website as of 2012. Its high-end products, including jewelry, were sold primarily through the retail stores. The direct channel focused on what Tiffany referred to as “D” items, which consisted primarily of non- gemstone sterling silver jewelry with an average price of $200 in 2007. Category D sales represented about 58 percent of

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106 Chapter 4 • Designing Distribution Networks and Applications to Online Sales

total sales for the direct channel. In contrast, more than half the retail sales came from high-end products such as diamond rings and gemstone jewelry with an average sale price in 2007 higher than $3,000.

Tiffany maintained its own manufacturing facili- ties in Rhode Island and New York but also continued to source from third parties. In 2007, the company sourced almost 60 percent of its jewelry from internal manufac- turing facilities. Tiffany had a retail service center in New Jersey that focused on receiving product from all over the world and replenishing its retail stores. The company had a separate customer fulfillment center for processing direct-to-customer orders.

Until 2003, the company did not purchase any rough diamonds, focusing entirely on the purchase of polished stones. Since then, the company established diamond-processing operations in Canada, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Belgium, China, and Viet- nam. In 2007, approximately 40 percent of the dia- monds used by Tiffany were produced from rough diamonds purchased by the company. Not all rough diamonds could be cut and polished to the quality

standards of Tiffany. Diamonds that failed to meet Tif- fany’s standards were then sold to third parties at mar- ket price, sometimes at a loss.

In 2012, 90 percent of Tiffany’s net sales came from jewelry, with approximately 48 percent of net sales coming from products containing diamonds of various sizes.6 Products containing one or more diamonds of one carat or larger accounted for more than 10 percent of net sales in 2007. Select financial details of Tiffany’s perfor- mance in 2012 are shown in Table 4-14.

The Tiffany brand’s association with quality, lux- ury, and exclusivity was an important part of its success. No other diamond and jewelry retailer enjoyed margins anywhere near those enjoyed by Tiffany. In its annual reports, the company listed the strong brand as a major risk factor because any dilution in its brand image would have a significant negative impact on its margins.

Study Questions

1. What are some key success factors in diamond retailing? How do Blue Nile, Zales, and Tiffany compare on those dimensions?

Table 4-14 Select Financial Data for Blue Nile, Inc., Zale Corporation, and Tiffany & Co. (in millions of dollars) for 2012

Blue Nile Zale Tiffany

Net sales 400.0 1,888.0 3,794.2

Cost of sales 325.0 903.6 1,631.0

Gross profit 75.1 984.4 2,163.2

Selling, general, and administrative expenses

62.8 915.5 1,466.1

Operating income 12.3 35.1 697.2

Net income 8.4 10.0 416.1

Cash and cash equivalents 87.0 17.1 504.8

Net receivables 4.4 – 253.5

Inventories 33.3 767.5 2,234.3

Total current assets 125.9 837.2 3,151.6

Property and equipment 7.9 108.9 818.8

Other assets 89 35.7 354.0

Total assets 145.9 1,187.3 4,630.9

Accounts payable 128.6 327.6 325.9

Stockholder equity 14.1 183.3 2,598.7

6Tiffany Annual Report, March 2013.

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Chapter 4 • Designing Distribution Networks and Applications to Online Sales 107

2. What do you think of the fact that Blue Nile carries many stones priced at $2,500 or higher, whereas a large fraction of the products sold from the Tiffany website are priced at around $200? Which of the two product categories is bet- ter suited to the strengths of the online channel?

3. What do you think of Tiffany’s decision to not sell engage- ment rings online? What do you think of Blue Nile’s growth into the non-engagement category?

4. Given that Tiffany stores have thrived with their focus on selling high-end jewelry, what do you think caused the failure of Zales’ upscale strategy in 2006? What products should Zale focus on?

5. Which of the three companies do you think is best struc- tured to deal with weak economic times?

6. What advice would you give to each of the three compa- nies regarding its strategy and structure?

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  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • ABOUT THE AUTHORS
  • ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Part I: Building a Strategic Framework to Analyze Supply Chains
    • Chapter 1 UNDERSTANDING THE SUPPLY CHAIN
      • 1.1 What Is a Supply Chain?
      • 1.2 The Objective of a Supply Chain
      • 1.3 The Importance of Supply Chain Decisions
      • 1.4 Decision Phases in a Supply Chain
      • 1.5 Process Views of a Supply Chain
      • 1.6 Examples of Supply Chains
      • 1.7 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Bibliography
    • Chapter 2 SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE: ACHIEVING STRATEGIC FIT AND SCOPE
      • 2.1 Competitive and Supply Chain Strategies
      • 2.2 Achieving Strategic Fit
      • 2.3 Expanding Strategic Scope
      • 2.4 Challenges to Achieving and Maintaining Strategic Fit
      • 2.5 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: The Demise of Blockbuster
    • Chapter 3 SUPPLY CHAIN DRIVERS AND METRICS
      • 3.1 Financial Measures of Performance
      • 3.2 Drivers of Supply Chain Performance
      • 3.3 Framework for Structuring Drivers
      • 3.4 Facilities
      • 3.5 Inventory
      • 3.6 Transportation
      • 3.7 Information
      • 3.8 Sourcing
      • 3.9 Pricing
      • 3.10 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: Seven-Eleven Japan Co.
      • CASE STUDY: Financial Statements for Walmart Stores Inc. and Macy’s Inc.
  • Part II: Designing the Supply Chain Network
    • Chapter 4 DESIGNING DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS AND APPlICATIONS TO ONLINE SAlES
      • 4.1 The Role of Distribution in the Supply Chain
      • 4.2 Factors Influencing Distribution Network Design
      • 4.3 Design Options for a Distribution Network
      • 4.4 Online Sales and the Distribution Network
      • 4.5 Distribution Networks in Practice
      • 4.6 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: Blue Nile and Diamond Retailing
    • Chapter 5 NETWORK DESIGN IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN
      • 5.1 The Role of Network Design in the Supply Chain
      • 5.2 Factors Influencing Network Design Decisions
      • 5.3 Framework for Network Design Decisions
      • 5.4 Models for Facility Location and Capacity Allocation
      • 5.5 Making Network Design Decisions in Practice
      • 5.6 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Exercises
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: Managing Growth at SportStuff.com
      • CASE STUDY: Designing the Production Network at CoolWipes
    • Chapter 6 DESIGNING GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORKS
      • 6.1 The Impact of Globalization on Supply Chain Networks
      • 6.2 The Offshoring Decision: Total Cost
      • 6.3 Risk Management in Global Supply Chains
      • 6.4 Discounted Cash Flows
      • 6.5 Evaluating Network Design Decisions Using Decision Trees
      • 6.6 To Onshore or Offshore: Evaluation of Global Supply Chain Design Decisions Under Uncertainty
      • 6.7 Making Global Supply Chain Design Decisions Under Uncertainty in Practice
      • 6.8 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Exercises
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: BioPharma, Inc.
      • CASE STUDY: The Sourcing Decision at Forever Young
  • Part III: Planning and Coordinating demand and Supply in a Supply Chain
    • Chapter 7 DEMAND FORECASTING IN A SUPPLY CHAIN
      • 7.1 The Role of Forecasting in a Supply Chain
      • 7.2 Characteristics of Forecasts
      • 7.3 Components of a Forecast and Forecasting Methods
      • 7.4 Basic Approach to Demand Forecasting
      • 7.5 Time-Series Forecasting Methods
      • 7.6 Measures of Forecast Error
      • 7.7 Selecting the Best Smoothing Constant
      • 7.8 Forecasting Demand at Tahoe Salt
      • 7.9 The Role of IT in Forecasting
      • 7.10 Forecasting in Practice
      • 7.11 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Exercises
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: Specialty Packaging Corporation
    • Chapter 8 AGGREGATE PLANNING IN A SUPPLY CHAIN
      • 8.1 The Role of Aggregate Planning in a Supply Chain
      • 8.2 The Aggregate Planning Problem
      • 8.3 Aggregate Planning Strategies
      • 8.4 Aggregate Planning at Red Tomato Tools
      • 8.5 Aggregate Planning Using Linear Programming
      • 8.6 Aggregate Planning in Excel
      • 8.7 Building a Rough Master Production Schedule
      • 8.8 The Role of IT in Aggregate Planning
      • 8.9 Implementing Aggregate Planning in Practice
      • 8.10 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Exercises
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: Kloss Planters and Harvesters
    • Chapter 9 SALES AND OPERATIONS PLANNING: PLANNING SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN A SUPPLY CHAIN
      • 9.1 Responding to Predictable Variability in the Supply Chain
      • 9.2 Managing Supply
      • 9.3 Managing Demand
      • 9.4 Sales and Operations Planning at Red Tomato
      • 9.5 Implementing Sales and Operations Planning in Practice
      • 9.6 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Exercises
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: Mintendo Game Girl
      • CASE STUDY: Promotion Challenges at Gulmarg Skis
    • Chapter 10 COORDINATION IN A SUPPLY CHAIN
      • 10.1 Lack of Supply Chain Coordination and the Bullwhip Effect
      • 10.2 The Effect on Performance of Lack of Coordination
      • 10.3 Obstacles to Coordination in a Supply Chain
      • 10.4 Managerial Levers to Achieve Coordination
      • 10.5 Continuous Replenishment and Vendor-Managed Inventories
      • 10.6 Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment
      • 10.7 Achieving Coordination in Practice
      • 10.8 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Bibliography
  • Part IV: Planning and Managing Inventories in a Supply Chain
    • Chapter 11 MANAGING ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN A SUPPLY CHAIN: CYCLE INVENTORY
      • 11.1 The Role of Cycle Inventory in a Supply Chain
      • 11.2 Estimating Cycle Inventory-Related Costs in Practice
      • 11.3 Economies of Scale to Exploit Fixed Costs
      • 11.4 Aggregating Multiple Products in a Single Order
      • 11.5 Economies of Scale to Exploit Quantity Discounts
      • 11.6 Short-Term Discounting: Trade Promotions
      • 11.7 Managing Multiechelon Cycle Inventory
      • 11.8 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Exercises
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: Delivery Strategy at MoonChem
      • CASE STUDY: Pricing and Delivery at KAR Foods
      • Appendix 11A: Economic Order Quantity
    • Chapter 12 MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN A SUPPLY CHAIN: SAFETY INVENTORY
      • 12.1 The Role of Safety Inventory in a Supply Chain
      • 12.2 Factors Affecting the Level of Safety Inventory
      • 12.3 Determining the Appropriate Level of Safety Inventory
      • 12.4 Impact of Supply Uncertainty on Safety Inventory
      • 12.5 Impact of Aggregation on Safety Inventory
      • 12.6 Impact of Replenishment Policies on Safety Inventory
      • 12.7 Managing Safety Inventory in a Multiechelon Supply Chain
      • 12.8 The Role of IT in Inventory Management
      • 12.9 Estimating and Managing Safety Inventory in Practice
      • 12.10 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Exercises
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: Managing Inventories at ALKO Inc.
      • CASE STUDY: Should Packing Be Postponed to the DC?
      • Appendix 12A: The Normal Distribution
      • Appendix 12B: The Normal Distribution in Excel
      • Appendix 12C: Expected Shortage per Replenishment Cycle
      • Appendix 12D: Evaluating Safety Inventory for Slow-Moving Items
    • Chapter 13 DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF PRODUCT AVAILABILITY
      • 13.1 The Importance of the Level of Product Availability
      • 13.2 Factors Affecting Optimal Level of Product Availability
      • 13.3 Managerial Levers to Improve Supply Chain Profitability
      • 13.4 Setting Product Availability for Multiple Products Under Capacity Constraints
      • 13.5 Setting Optimal Levels of Product Availability in Practice
      • 13.6 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Exercises
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: The Need for Speed at Winner Apparel
      • Appendix 13A: Optimal Level of Product Availability
      • Appendix 13B: An Intermediate Evaluation
      • Appendix 13C: Expected Profit from an Order
      • Appendix 13D: Expected Overstock from an Order
      • Appendix 13E: Expected Understock from an Order
      • Appendix 13F: Simulation Using Spreadsheets
  • Part V: Designing and Planning Transportation Networks
    • Chapter 14 TRANSPORTATION IN A SUPPLY CHAIN
      • 14.1 The Role of Transportation in a Supply Chain
      • 14.2 Modes of Transportation and Their Performance Characteristics
      • 14.3 Transportation Infrastructure and Policies
      • 14.4 Design Options for a Transportation Network
      • 14.5 Mumbai Dabbawalas: A Highly Responsive Distribution Network
      • 14.6 Trade-Offs in Transportation Design
      • 14.7 Tailored Transportation
      • 14.8 The Role of IT in Transportation
      • 14.9 Making Transportation Decisions in Practice
      • 14.10 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: Designing the Distribution Network for Michael’s Hardware
      • CASE STUDY: The Future of Same-Day Delivery: Same as the Past?
      • CASE STUDY: Selecting Transportation Modes for China Imports
  • Part VI: Managing Cross-Functional Drivers in a Supply Chain
    • Chapter 15 SOURCING DECISIONS IN A SUPPLY CHAIN
      • 15.1 The Role of Sourcing in a Supply Chain
      • 15.2 In-House or Outsource?
      • 15.3 Examples of Successful Third-Party Suppliers
      • 15.4 Total Cost of Ownership
      • 15.5 Supplier Selection—Auctions and Negotiations
      • 15.6 Sharing Risk and Reward in the Supply Chain
      • 15.7 The Impact of Incentives When Outsourcing
      • 15.8 Designing a Sourcing Portfolio: Tailored Sourcing
      • 15.9 Making Sourcing Decisions in Practice
      • 15.10 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Exercises
      • Bibliography
    • Chapter 16 PRICING AND REVENUE MANAGEMENT IN A SUPPLY CHAIN
      • 16.1 The Role of Pricing and Revenue Management in a Supply Chain
      • 16.2 Pricing and Revenue Management for Multiple Customer Segments
      • 16.3 Pricing and Revenue Management for Perishable Assets
      • 16.4 Pricing and Revenue Management for Seasonal Demand
      • 16.5 Pricing and Revenue Management for Bulk and Spot Contracts
      • 16.6 Using Pricing and Revenue Management in Practice
      • 16.7 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Exercises
      • Bibliography
      • CASE STUDY: To Savor or to Groupon?
    • Chapter 17 SUSTAINABILITY AND THE SUPPLY CHAIN
      • 17.1 The Role of Sustainability in a Supply Chain
      • 17.2 The Tragedy of the Commons
      • 17.3 Key Pillars of Sustainability
      • 17.4 Sustainability and Supply Chain Drivers
      • 17.5 Closed-Loop Supply Chains
      • 17.6 The Pricing of Sustainability
      • 17.7 Summary of Learning Objectives
      • Discussion Questions
      • Bibliography
  • Index
    • A
    • B
    • C
    • D
    • E
    • F
    • G
    • H
    • I
    • J
    • K
    • L
    • M
    • N
    • O
    • P
    • Q
    • R
    • S
    • T
    • U
    • V
    • W
    • Z
 
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